A special case of dollarization is analyzed: quotation of prices in dollars. The proposed explanation is price stickiness: when price adjustment is costly, firms prefer to fix their prices in a stable foreign currency in order to avoid frequent price changes. The proposed model demonstrates that there are often two Nash equilibria in an economy populated by symmetric firms: an equilibrium with uniform domestic currency pricing and one with uniform dollar pricing. Hence, foreign currency pricing may exhibit hysteresis. The model also demonstrates that the degree of competition in the economy is important in determining the pricing currency.
choose assets denominated in the currency that yields the higher expected return. The store of value function of money is, to some extent, linked to its means of exchange function: individuals often find it more convenient to conduct substantial transactions in the currency in which they hold their savings. Hence, the standard approach can, at least partially, explain the use of foreign currency as a means of exchange. However, it hardly helps to understand the use of foreign currency as a unit of account (see Calvo and Vegh, 1996 , for the survey of the theoretical research on dollarization). In this sense, our paper complements the existing research on dollarization by analyzing its relevance to this remaining function of money-unit of account. However, since this form of dollarization is quite different in nature from what is usually examined, we label the phenomenon of quoting prices in foreign currency as "foreign currency pricing," henceforth denoted FCP.
We explain the firms' decision to denominate prices in dollars as a case of price stickiness. During times of high inflation, quoting prices in the domestic currency would require frequent price adjustments. If price adjustment is costly due to some sort of menu costs, sellers may prefer to denominate prices for their products in a stable foreign currency, which allows them to maintain fixed prices for a much longer period. However, the strategy of individually switching to a different pricesetting currency has certain drawbacks, as such a switch makes a firm vulnerable to fluctuations of the exchange rate, which can throw that firm's price rather far from the prices of other firms. In our model, we abstract from the fact that if the majority of transactions is conducted in domestic currency, pricing in a foreign currency itself has transaction costs, as the sellers need to watch the exchange rate and calculate the ruble value of the dollar price for each sale. Although these costs exist, we believe they are minor in comparison to continuously marking up the ruble price.
The model presented in this paper shows how an individual imperfectly competitive firm's choice of the price-setting currency is determined by the following features of the environment: the relation between the inflation rate and the exchange rate volatility, the currency in which competitors set prices, and the currency in which inputs are priced. The pricing strategy of competitors is important for the firm's decision in the case of a high degree of real price rigidity in the sense of Ball and Romer (1990) . This real rigidity is generated by a smoothed-out kink in the demand curve, following Kimball (1995) , as well as a low and countercyclical desired mark-up. Such a demand curve compels firms to keep their prices close to those of their competitors.
It is pointed out in Calvo and Vegh (1996) that dollarization, in the standard understanding of the word, typically appears to exhibit "hysteresis," in the sense that the degree of dollarization (measured as the proportion of foreign currency deposits in broad money) does not immediately decrease in response to a reduction in inflation. Although there is no consensus in explaining hysteresis for this type of dollarization, 1 hysteresis in the foreign currency pricing is easy to explain. Our 1. Among the most popular explanation attempts are those based on the role of financial adaptation Reynoso, 1989, Dornbusch, Sturzenegger, and Wolf, 1990) , costs of switching to a different currency (Guidotti and Rodriguez, 1992, Sturzenegger, 1993) , and optimal portfolio considerations under the assumption of perfect capital mobility (Calvo and Vegh 1996) . model predicts that firms that turn to dollar pricing during a period of high inflation may continue to denominate prices in dollars long after the stabilization of inflation. The source of hysteresis in the model is multiple equilibria, which arise when firms try to avoid large deviations between their price and the prices of competitors. A firm would not decide to individually change to a different price-setting currency even if the inflation environment changed.
Finally, it is shown in the model that the level of competition has an important influence on firms' choice of price-setting currency. In a more competitive economy, a larger increase in the inflation rate may be needed to push the economy into the dollar-pricing equilibrium. Correspondingly, a larger decrease in the inflation rate is required to make the economy switch back to the ruble-pricing equilibrium. This finding is consistent with an informal observation that firms selling luxury items with high mark-ups, such as extravagant restaurants, gourmet food, or expensive clothing, have been practicing FCP the most. These goods and services could be thought as less competitive than similar services in cheaper cafes and stores that offer more homogeneous products and cater to the general public. At the same time, this could also mean that luxury items requiring bigger transactions are priced in dollars.
In a way, this paper is related not so much to the literature on dollarization, but rather to the debate on local currency pricing (LCP) versus producer currency pricing (PCP) in the modern "New open economy macroeconomics" paradigm (see Lane (2001) for a survey). Thus, foreign currency pricing can be thought of as an extreme case of producer currency pricing, in the sense that FCP implies perfect exchange rate pass-through not only for imports, but also potentially for all goods in the economy, including nontradable goods. Hence, FCP can have important implications for monetary policy and the analysis of exchange rate volatility. Thus, FCP, even more so than PCP, generates big effects of the exchange rate on consumption. Therefore, in a general equilibrium model with FCP, exchange rates can be expected to become less volatile endogenously, in order for consumption not to move too much. This reasoning is analogous to the standard result that PCP allows for much less volatility of the exchange rate than LCP. Within the LCP-PCP debate, the papers analogous to ours are Friberg (1998) , as well as van Wincoop (2003, 2005) . These authors also study how sellers choose the currency, in which to price their product, finding that many of the same factors as in our paper, such as pricing strategies of competitors and input suppliers, as well as the degree of competition, play a role. The difference, however, is that Friberg, Bacchetta, and van Wincoop study the choice of currency for imported goods based purely on exchange rate uncertainty, with the price being predetermined but not necessarily rigid. In contrast, we concentrate on the role of inflation and exchange rate volatility in a sticky-price environment for all goods, including nontradables.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives an informal description of the extent of FCP in Russia. Section 2 shows the existence of multiple equilibria in a simple, reduced-form example, in which firms suffer quadratic losses from deviating from the optimal price. In the example, we ignore the issue of input pricing and concentrate solely on inflation rate, exchange rate volatility, and the pricing currency of competitors. The result is that a dollar-pricing economy would never revert back to local currency, even if inflation is brought to zero. In Section 3 we extend the model to include prices of inputs and demonstrate that the denomination of input prices can play an important role in a firm's choice of price-setting currency. The role of input prices becomes crucial if real rigidity is relatively weak. In Section 3 we also demonstrate that if input prices are denominated in rubles, exit from dollar-pricing equilibrium becomes possible. Section 4 concludes.
SOME FACTS
Although this paper is a theoretical exercise, for motivational purposes we show pricing currencies for a sample of product groups in Moscow. Table 1 shows which currency sellers in Moscow choose to denominate their prices. These figures were obtained in the fall of 2001 by calling 20 sellers within each of the 20 product groups listed in the table. Sellers were selected at random from the Yellow Pages. Each of the sellers was asked the price of a certain product, and we noted the currency of the quoted price. The table shows that pricing in dollars is widespread but not dominant. In advertising, everything was priced in dollars, while lunch deliveries, notary services, and garage rent were all priced in rubles. The other product groups had mixed representation of both types of pricing. This table may seem to contradict our theoretical result that in equilibrium everyone should turn to one currency. However, this can be explained by low homogeneity within these product groups: if we divided restaurants into the categories "cheap" and "expensive," we would see that the latter category would almost uniformly use dollar pricing. Similarly, introducing heterogeneity to firms in the model that follows could also lead to different pricing strategies. Hence, the table is meant to demonstrate the extent of the studied phenomenon rather than argue in favor of a particular model.
An example of markets that are clearly caught in different equilibria is apartment markets in different cities. Some Russian cities, such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, Tver, and Nizhniy Novgorod, have been pricing their apartments almost exclusively in dollars. Other cities, such as Novosibirsk, Omsk, Perm, and Ulyanovsk, have been pricing in rubles. Figure 1 demonstrates that pricing in different currencies lead to drastically different price behavior following the large devaluation of ruble and output collapse in August 1998.
It is easy to think of other groups of goods, which are priced predominantly in dollars. For example, Russian internet stores have their price lists predominantly in dollars. Many stores put dollar prices on the internet, while at the same time quoting ruble prices in the stores themselves. This type of behavior suggests that stores perhaps would like to price in dollars, but do not do so, because they need a special permission from the city of Moscow. Yet, their ruble prices may be directly tied to a certain fixed dollar value, which they count for themselves and quote on the internet.
EXPECTED LOSSES FROM PRICE STICKINESS IN A SIMPLE FRAMEWORK
Here we investigate the relative losses of a firm that sets the price of its product in either rubles or dollars in either a dollarized environment (when all other firms price in dollars) or in an environment in which other firms set prices in the local currency (hereafter rubles). These losses will be assessed and compared along the steady-state path with a constant rate of inflation. The theoretical framework is standard and similar in spirit to that used by Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) , in which a continuum of small, monopolistically competitive firms produce differentiated products and set prices in a staggered fashion. The deviation from that model is that money supply grows at a constant and predictable rate µ, so that if all firms price in local currency, then the economy follows a steady-state path, despite individually sticky prices. That is, in a staggered price-setting environment, the aggregation across firms guarantees a smooth rate of inflation and constant output according to the quantity equation
where y is log output, m is log money supply, and p is the log aggregate price level, and constant velocity is normalized to unity. Normalizing the initial price level and the output to unity as well, and hence their logarithm to zero, we get
We make an important assumption about the path of the exchange rate, e. Although the rate is expected to follow the price level according to the PPP hypothesis, it is allowed to fluctuate randomly around that trend. Thus, in every period, the log exchange rate is distributed according to
where ε t is an iid shock to the exchange rate. An implicit assumption here is that the foreign inflation is zero, which simply means that domestic inflation is assumed to be high enough relative to foreign inflation for the latter to be ignored.
Note that if all of the firms in the economy set their prices in dollars, then the general price level fluctuates together with the exchange rate, as does the output according to Equation (1). If all prices are set in rubles, however, then the price level is smooth and the output is constant.
The form of price stickiness is assumed to be as in Calvo (1983) . That is, each firm receives a signal to adjust its price at a stochastic rate α, the arrivals of such signals being independent across firms. At each moment in time, a firm's losses are quadratic in the deviation of the current price from the optimal one. These losses are represented by the formula
where p i,t is the price charged by the firm i, and p # t is the instantaneously optimal "desired" price (identical for all firms), given by the standard expression
where the full-employment output is normalized to zero, and φ is a measure of "real rigidity." Let us now turn to the examination of the four distinct cases: pricing in rubles and dollars in ruble-pricing and dollar-pricing environments.
Pricing in Rubles in Ruble-Pricing Environment
First of all, when everyone prices in rubles, the loss function can be expressed in terms of deviation from the aggregate price level, as it is simultaneously the desired price. This can be seen from Equation (3) and the fact that output is constant at the full-employment level when pricing is universally in rubles.
For purposes of simplicity, throughout the paper we consider a firm setting its price at time zero. Since all firms are symmetric, the problem of a firm setting its price at any other time would yield the same expected losses. A firm setting its price at zero solves
Thus, the firm chooses a constant price, p i , to minimize losses incurred while this price is in effect. We call this the "reset" price, as this is the price that firms choose once given a stochastic signal to adjust. In principle, the subscript i is not needed because any firm adjusting its price at time t would choose the same reset price. Yet, since we concentrate on profit losses of an individual firm, we retain the subscript for clarity. Future losses are discounted by the probability of the price still being in effect at t, equal to (1 Ϫ α)
t . E 0 denotes expectation at time zero, which in this case is unnecessary because the problem is entirely deterministic.
The solution to the minimization problem is obtained by remembering that p t ϭ µt and by observing that
. The resultant optimal reset price at time zero (throughout the paper denoted by a star) is then given by
Thus, we see that the price depends positively on the inflation rate, which is quite intuitive: the optimal price is a weighted average of future optimal prices, which are expected to be higher with a higher inflation rate. 2 Likewise, a higher α implies a lower price because the expected length of time for this price to remain in effect is shorter; hence, the future high aggregate price level is discounted more heavily.
Plugging the expression for p* into Expression (4) and observing that Σ
, we obtain the following expression for expected losses:
Here, L rr stands for "losses with pricing in rubles when others price in rubles." Again, it is intuitive that these losses depend positively on the rate of inflation and negatively on the rate of price adjustment.
Pricing in Dollars in Ruble-Pricing Environment
Once dollar pricing is in the picture, uncertainty is introduced. The problem now becomes
Here, before observing the time zero exchange rate, the firm i sets a constant price p f i , and the ruble price is then given by e t ϩ p f i , which on average increases in line with the optimal price, but with deviations of the size determined by the variance of the exchange rate. Minimizing, we get
Thus, the assumption of quadratic loss leads to perfect certainty-equivalence: the firm sets the price at the current optimum, since the ruble price is expected to grow with that optimum. The variability of the ruble price does not affect the decision. Plugging this zero into Expression (5) and noting that
As expected, the losses depend on the variability of the exchange rate but not on the inflation rate. These losses are caused by fluctuations of the relative price of a 2. A firm setting its price at time τ would choose p* i ϭ µτ ϩ µ(1 Ϫ α)րα. This is the only part of the answer that depends on the time of price-setting, and this difference does not affect the rest of the results. firm: the price is too low when the local currency appreciates and too high when the local currency is weak. Although the firm's price is "right" on average, the firm suffers losses from having its price different from the rest of the market.
Pricing in Rubles in Dollar-Pricing Environment
When general pricing is in dollars, output is no longer constant, and the aggregate price level is no longer equivalent to the desired price. Instead, since p t ϭ e t , 3 y t ϭ m t Ϫ e t , thus the desired price is obtained from Equation (3) as
Then, the minimization problem is
The optimal reset price is
which is exactly the same as the price quoted by a firm that prices in rubles in a ruble-pricing environment (Section 2.1). Once again, with certainty-equivalence, only expectations matter. Expected losses, on the other hand, have an additional term in comparison to the losses in Section 2.1
The first term in the brackets remains unchanged and represents the losses from not keeping up with inflation. The second term represents additional losses associated with straying from the group. That is, in a competitive environment, the firm incurs losses not only because the economy operates above or below the full-employment level of output (which occurs in this model only when everyone prices in dollars), but also because the firm's price differs from that of its competitors, as in the previous section. Here, the aggregate price level fluctuates with the exchange rate, but firm i does not adjust its price; hence, firm i's relative price is highly variable. Losses thus incurred are especially large for low values of φ, which is logical: low φ implies strong real rigidity; that is, each firm's optimal price is dictated more strongly by others' prices than by the aggregate demand. Such a situation is likely to occur in a more competitive system, as noted by Calvo (2000) . 
Pricing in Dollars in Dollar-Pricing Environment
This last possibility is quite straightforward, as all the relevant issues have been discussed in previous sections. The minimization problem is
the optimal price is p f * i ϭ 0, as before, and the expected losses are
Here, once again, the losses depend on the value of φ, this time positively. Again, a low φ means that firms would not want their prices to deviate much from those of others, and this is precisely what is achieved when everyone prices in dollars: although all firms' prices are away from the full-employment price, the prices are the same, and, hence, the losses are small. If φ is large, on the other hand, aggregate demand is more significant than the relative price, so losses from fluctuating far from the steady-state price are great.
Comparing the Losses
The above findings, in terms of losses from price stickiness, are summarized in Table 2 .
One important result is that it is impossible to say whether uniform pricing in dollars is better or worse than uniform pricing in rubles. Comparison of E 0 L rr and E 0 L dd depends on the values of the inflation rate, the exchange rate volatility, and the degree of real rigidity. Of course, an argument can be made that such comparison is difficult because the volatility of the exchange rate should be different in dollarpricing and ruble-pricing environments.
The most striking result, however, is that E 0 L rd Ͼ E 0 L dd for reasonable values of φ, whenever φ Ͻ 1/2 even with µ ϭ 0. This implies that if all firms in the economy price in dollars, then no firm will choose to switch to rubles even if inflation is brought to zero. This is once again caused by the fact that, in a competitive environment, firms lose from relative price fluctuations and prefer that their price stay close to that of the competitors. At the same time, if inflation is brought to a low enough level, all firms would benefit from an organized switch to ruble pricing, since E 0 L rr Ͻ E 0 L dd for low µ. Thus, we face a situation of multiple equilibria, in which the economy can be caught indefinitely in a dominated dollarized equilibrium. It would take a coordinated action to switch to a dominant one.
Note that the same is true in the opposite direction, though not to the same extent. In a ruble environment, a firm would choose to change to dollar pricing unilaterally as soon as µ Ͼ ασր√1 Ϫ α (this is the condition for E 0 L dr Ͻ E 0 L rr ). Thus, with high enough inflation, the economy will switch to dollar pricing. However, assuming φ Ͻ 1, all firms would benefit from a coordinated change at an even lower value of inflation, as E 0 L dd Ͻ E 0 L rr whenever µ Ͼ φασր√1 Ϫ α. Between these two levels of inflation, the economy would once again be trapped in a dominated equilibrium.
INTRODUCING INPUT COSTS
One drawback of the model proposed in Section 2 is that it does not take into account the denomination of input prices, and it is hardly in line with the empirical facts. Thus, reasonable parameter values would suggest that all prices in Russia should now be denominated in dollars, yet during recent years, as inflation came down, domestic sellers seem to have shifted somewhat toward pricing in rubles. A possible explanation is that some of the inputs of the producers may be priced in rubles, which can have an effect on the choice of the currency, in which to price the final goods. Indeed, a significant share of inputs (electricity and rail transportation, for example) is priced according to ruble-denominated state-controlled tariffs. Hence, in this section we develop a model, which allows pricing of inputs in different currencies. The model indeed delivers the result that a return to ruble pricing is possible, although still difficult in the presence of strong real rigidity.
When the firm has to purchase inputs for production, its desired price takes the form
where p I t is the log of the input price, P I t . This expression is analogous to Equation (3) in Section 2, which relates the desired price to the output gap. Coefficients φ and ψ are related to real rigidity: they show to what degree the desired relative price responds to fluctuations in the aggregate demand and the price of inputs. Low values of φ and ψ indicate strong real rigidity, so that individual desired price is only slightly sensitive to changes in total output and costs. The Appendix shows how Equations (3) and (8) can be derived from explicit optimization problems. For the sake of generality, deriving Equations (3) and (8) we do not specify exact analytical forms for the demand and cost functions; instead we describe the behavior of these functions around a steady state.
Real rigidity can be generated by a traditional set of conditions on the shape of demand and cost functions, commonly used in the literature. Thus, following Kimball (1995) , we allow the individual demand curves to have a smoothed-out kink at the steady-state relative price, which reflects that it is easier for a firm to lose customers by raising its relative price above unity than attract new customers by lowering the relative price below unity. Next, the desired mark-up is allowed to be countercyclical. Such a countercyclical mark-up has been advocated in much of the business-cycle literature (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a survey). Finally, we adopt a usual assumption of increasing marginal costs. It is argued in the Appendix that under these assumptions, for plausible values of the demand and cost function parameters, the coefficients φ and ψ from Equation (8) 
Thus, the desired price depends positively on both the aggregate demand and the marginal cost of production. However, the desired price responds less than one for one to changes in each of these factors.
With the desired price given by Equation (8), the firm's instantaneous losses from price nonoptimality (2) take the form
where p i,t is the price charged by a firm i at time t. Hence, if firm i denominates its price in rubles, then it chooses the reset price at time zero by solving
If firm i denominates its price in dollars, then the firm solves
The optimization problems (9) and (10) are solved analogously to problems (4)- (7) of Section 2. Table 3 shows the profit losses associated with ruble and dollar pricing. Comparing losses from ruble and dollar pricing, one can see that there always exists a unique threshold value of inflation, which corresponds to an individual firm's switch from pricing in one currency to pricing in another: with the inflation rate lower than the threshold a firm chooses to denominate its price in rubles, while with the inflation rate higher than the threshold, a firm prefers to denominate its price in dollars. The threshold values of inflation are summarized in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that denomination of input prices is important for a firm's choice of price-setting currency. Regardless of the pricing strategy of competitors, a lower rate of inflation is sufficient to make an individual firm turn to dollar pricing when inputs are priced in dollars. The denomination of input prices becomes crucial when real rigidity is weak (high values of φ ϩ ψ). When real rigidity is strong, Inputs priced in rubles L
however, an individual choice of price-setting currency is largely dictated by the pricing strategy of competitors, while the denomination of input prices becomes less important. The model predicts two stable equilibria for any denomination of inputs: there will be uniform ruble pricing whenever µ Ͻ μ ·R and uniform dollar pricing whenever µ Ͼ μ ·D . Thus, during a period of high inflation an economy falls into the equilibrium with dollar pricing as soon as the rate of inflation exceeds μ ·R . For the economy to exit from the dollar-pricing equilibrium, inflation must drop below μ ·D . Note that, for reasonable parameter values, (φ Ͻ 1/2) exit from the dollar-pricing equilibrium is possible only with input prices denominated in rubles. If input prices are denominated in dollars, no firm will choose to switch individually to pricing in rubles even if inflation is reduced to zero, which replicates the result of Section 2.
Even when input prices are denominated in rubles, exit from the dollar-pricing equilibrium is possible only if real rigidity is not too strong (specifically, φ ϩ ψ Ͼ 1/2). Individual desired prices must be dictated primarily by aggregate demand and input costs, rather than by prices of competitors, in order for firms to choose to deviate from competitors and switch individually to ruble pricing.
The areas in which multiple equilibria exist are also related to the degree of real rigidity. With a lower degree of real rigidity, a smaller increase in inflation is enough to push the economy into the dollar-pricing equilibrium, when input prices are denominated in dollars; a smaller drop in inflation is sufficient for the economy to exit from dollar-pricing equilibrium. The logic is straightforward. With lower real rigidity, it is less costly for an individual firm to deviate from its competitors; hence, a lower change in inflation is enough to make a firm desire to change its pricing strategy independently of others.
As we have already pointed out in Section 2, Calvo (2000) relates the higher degree of real rigidity to a more competitive environment. A higher degree of competitiveness corresponds to a higher price elasticity of individual demand, and hence, reduces both coefficients φ and ψ (see Appendix for the expressions for φ and ψ). Thus, the presented model predicts that in a more competitive environment, Inputs priced in rubles
in dollars a greater increase in inflation is needed to make firms switch to pricing in dollars, as the costs of deviating individually to a pricing strategy different from the strategy of competitors are higher in such an environment. However, this conclusion is true only if inputs are priced in dollars; otherwise, the degree of competitiveness does not matter. Similarly, in a more competitive environment, a larger drop in inflation is needed to make firms change from pricing in dollars back to pricing in rubles. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in Moscow, during the early years of transition, prices for a number of goods, including clothing, sports equipment, furniture, etc., were being denominated almost uniformly in dollars in the less competitive, expensive stores, but mainly in rubles in the cheaper shops and markets, which are oriented more toward poorer customers who pay close attention to price differences. Furthermore, prices for domestic products of high quality in the expensive stores were often denominated in dollars, while prices for low quality imports in the cheap stores and markets were usually set in rubles. These informal observations are consistent with the predictions of the model, as luxury goods and services are generally less homogeneous and less competitive.
Informal observations in Russia and other countries (Israel, for example) also suggest that FCP exhibits hysteresis: when inflation is high, firms turn to quoting prices in dollars, but reduction of inflation does not immediately push firms back to the local currency. Firms can continue denominating prices in dollars long after the stabilization of inflation. Clearly, multiplicity of equilibria obtained in our model can explain these observations. When inflation is high, firms switch to foreign currency pricing, but do not return to pricing in the local currency after stabilization. FCP practice can go on indefinitely, although this equilibrium is inefficient. This result can be used as an argument in favor of policies, which stimulate a shift back to the local currency after inflation is brought down.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a model that explains the behavior of sellers, who prefer to quote their prices in a foreign currency, as is common in Russia and some other countries, which experienced episodes of high inflation. We show that this strategy can be optimal in the case of sticky prices, and, therefore, producers practice foreign currency pricing (FCP) in order to avoid frequent price changes. Correspondingly, their choice of pricing currency is shown to depend on the level of inflation and exchange rate volatility. Also, it is shown that an economy can be stuck in a dominant dollar-pricing equilibrium.
The presented model demonstrates that, besides the inflation rate and the exchange rate volatility, the pricing strategies of the firm's competitors and its input suppliers are important for the choice of price-setting currency. In many situations, two equilibria exist: an equilibrium with uniform ruble pricing and an equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing. The relation between the ranges of these two equilibria is determined by the pricing strategy of the input suppliers and by the degree of real rigidity.
The multiplicity of equilibria produces a hysteresis effect: the inflation rate needed to make firms switch from the equilibrium with ruble pricing to the equilibrium with dollar pricing exceeds the rate of inflation under which firms can exit from the dollar-pricing equilibrium and turn back to pricing in rubles. The strength of the hysteresis effect increases with the degree of real rigidity. It is also shown that exit from the equilibrium with uniform dollar pricing is possible only when the input price is denominated in rubles. When input price is denominated in dollars, for plausible parameter values, no firm will turn individually from pricing in dollars back to pricing in rubles, even if the inflation rate is reduced to zero.
Finally, it is shown in the model that the level of competition has an influence on the choice of price-setting currency made by firms within the economy. In a more competitive economy, a greater increase in inflation is needed to push the economy into the dollar-pricing equilibrium; a larger drop in inflation is required to make the economy switch back to the ruble-pricing equilibrium. .
Note that the coefficient φ is the same as in the previous case, where input pricing was not taken into account. Under our assumptions of a kinked demand curve, countercyclical desired mark-up, and increasing marginal costs, the coefficients φ and ψ satisfy 0 Ͻ φ Ͻ 1; 0 Ͻ ψ Ͻ 1; φ ϩ ψ Ͻ 1 .
The positive values of φ and ψ are needed for stability. ψ Ͼ 0 follows directly from the assumptions about a kinked demand curve, which implies that near the steady state the desired mark-up is declining with respect to the relative price charged by a firm, M 1 (1, 1) Ͻ 0; and increasing marginal costs, MC′(1) Ͼ 0. Countercyclical desired mark-up implies M 2 (1, 1) Ͻ 0. However, if the countercyclicality of the desired mark-up is not overly strong, which is a plausible assumption, φ Ͼ 0 also holds. The condition φ ϩ ψ Ͻ 1 implies that the elasticity of individual demand is lower than the price elasticity. This assumption is again standard; for example, Kimball (1995) chose the first number to be unity, while the other to be 11 in his calibration.
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